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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK ALDON HEWITT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.THE GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
8052

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case, at the conclusion of the presentation
of evidence, the respondent made a motion for a directed
verdict which motion the court took under advisement
pending the verdict of the jury. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the appellant on April 23, 1953 (R. 3).
On the same date the clerk signed and entered the judgment on the verdict (R. 4). Thereafter the respondent
renewed its motion for directed verdict and in the alternative for a new trial (R. 5-6). The court granted the
motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment not1
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withstanding the verdict in favor of the respondent, no
cause of action (R. 8-9). From this judgment the appellant appealed and this court on May 24, 1955, filed its
decision reversing the trial court and ordering that the
judgment upon the jury verdict be reinstated (R. 11-15).
Upon denial of the petition for rehearing the remittitur
was issued December 2, 1955 (R. 10). The respondent
made a motion to deny interest and retax costs which
was heard on January 25, 1956, and the District Court
made and entered an order disallowing the appellant's
interest from the date of the judgment on the verdict
to the date of the order entered by the Supreme Court
denying the petition for rehearing (R. 18, 23). From
this order appellant has filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINT UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIES

The appellant is entitled to interest on the verdict
and the judgment from April 23, 1953, until paid.
ARGUMENT
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code .Annotated, 1953, provides
that the judgment obtained in this case shall bear interest
at the rate of 8% per annum. Rule 54 (e) provides as
follows:
"(e) lutcrcst and Costs to be Included in the
.! nd_qmcut. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict
or decision from the time it was rendered, and
the costs, if the same haYe been taxed or ascer2
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tained. The clerk must, within two days after
the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any
case where not included in the judgment, insert
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment
for that purpose, and make a similar notation
thereof in the Register of Actions and in the
Judgment Docket.''
It is the view of the Appellant that Rule 54 (e) is
decisive of the question now before this Court, as it
requires the Clerk to include in the judgment signed
by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the
date it was rendered. Both the verdict and the judgment
on the verdict were entered on April 23, 1953. It has
been similarly decided in California, which has a statute
substantially identical to ours. Section 1035, California
Code of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:

''The Clerk must include in the judgment
entered up by him any interest on the verdict or
decision of the court from the date it was rendered
or made, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained; and he must, within two
days after the same are taxed or ascertained, if
not included in the judgment, insert the same in
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and
must make a similar insertion of the costs in the
copies and docket of the judgment.''
The above section was re-enacted in 1933 as part
of Section 1033 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
We desire to refer the court to the case of Bond rs.
United States Railroad of Sam Francisco ( 1911) (Calif.)
113 P. 2d 366. In that case the jury returned a general
verdict in the amount of $4,500.00 and the jury also made
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answer to certain particular questions of fact. On the
basis of those answers, the defendant moved the court
to return a judgment to the plaintiff for $405.00 and no
more, which motion the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed, and the Appellant Court ordered that the
court below enter judgment for the plaintiff in the
amount of the general verdict of $4,500.00. In applying
the above-mentioned California statute, the court held
as follows (at page 373):
''The appellant asks the court to modify the
judgment heretofore given by adding a direction
that in giving the judgment in the court below
the accrued interest on the verdict shall be included. Our consideration of the verdict and
judgment was entirely in relation to the state of
the case at the time the judgment appealed from
was given in the court below. It was with reference to that period that w-e directed the entry of
judgment by that court for the sum of $4,500
upon the going down of the remittitur. There was
no intention to restrict the power of the court
below, or of its clerk, to perform the ministerial
duty of computing the interest which has accrued
between the date of the return of the verdict and
the entry of the judgment and including it in the
judgment finally entered, as provided by section
1035 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court
below will lw at liberty to perform that duty, or
f'P(' that its clerk does so. notwithstanding the
l:mg-nage of the mandate of the decision hereinbefore g-iYen by this court.''
See also (;olden Oatc 1lfill and Jliuiug Company vs.
Joshua H c }/(IN Jl achine n:r orks (Calif.) ~3 P. 45; Degnan
'Us. roun_q Bndhcrs' Cattle Co. (I(an.) 103 P. 2d 918;
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Glen vs. Rice (Calif.) 162 P. 1020. In the latter case, the
court held that interest ran from the original date of
the judgment upon modification of the judgment by the
appellant court. See also Zeidler vs. Goelzer (Wis.) 211
N.W. 140. In that case, under a statute which directs
that interest from the date of the verdict shall be computed by the clerk and added to the costs of the party
entitled thereto, it was held that interest should run from
the date of the verdict on the original trial even though
an intervening new trial was ordered on appeal for the
determination of a single issue.

We also desire to refer the court to the case of
Stever vs. Associated Transport, Inc., 63 N.Y.S. 2d 606,
affirmed in 70 N. E. 2d 169. In that case the jury rendered a verdict in the amount of $40,000.00. A motion
for new trial was made on all the statutory grounds.
The court granted the motion on the ground of excessiveness of damages but stipulated for denial of the motion
in the event plaintiff would accept a lesser amount of
$22,500.00. The plaintiff failed to accept the reduction
and appealed. On appeal the order granting the new
trial was affirmed with leave given to the plaintiff to
accept the reduced amount. The plaintiff accepted, and
included in the amount of the judgment was $1185.00,
interest from the date that the verdict was entered to
the date of judgment. It \vas held that plaintiff was
entitled to interest from the date of the verdict.
The case of J.Y! etcalf vs. City of W atertoum, C.C.A.
7th, 68 F. 859, was a suit upon a judgment. In that
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case the trial court made a finding to the effect that a
judgment had been rendered in the sum averred in the
complaint but gave judgment to the defendant on the
ground that the statute of limitation barred recovery.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order and directed the trial court to enter judgment for
the plaintiff on the finding. Afterwards, at the same
term of court, the trial court disallowed interest from
the date of the original finding and the entry of the
judgment from which the plaintiff appealed. The court
said at page 864:
''The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed with costs, and the cause remanded with
direction that the appellant be given judgment
for the amount due upon the finding of August
2, 1889, including interest to that date, with
interest thereon to the date of judgment hereby
ordered ... ''
There is a statute in Wisconsin which provides that
the clerk shall add interest from the date of the verdict
or report.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has adopted, and in several cases reaffirmed,
the rule which we seek this court to apply here. The
leading case is Louisiana aud Arkansas Railway Company rs. Pratt, C.C.A. 5th, 142 F. 2d 847. In that case
the plaintiff brought a suit under the F.E.L.A. and
obtained a verdict for $5,000.00, but the trial court
entered judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant. On appeal the judgment was reversed and the cause
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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remanded with instructions that judgment be entered
upon the verdict. The judgment entered pursuant to the
mandate allowed interest from the date of ''judicial
demand", applying the Louisiana statute. The defendant appealed on the interest point only. We quote from
the decision, commencing at page 853 :
''In all actions for personal injuries brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
remedy given by that statute is exclusive, and all
state laws are superseded in so far as they
attempt to cover the same field. At the time the
Act was enacted, interest was not allowable on
claims for personal injuries until the amount of
damages had been judicially ascertained. This
was upon the theory that no debt was due prior
thereto or that interest was a part of the damages and was merged therewith in the amount
awarded ... "
''The determination that interest was not
properly allowable from the date of judicial
demand gives rise to the inquiry as to the date
from which it should begin to run. The only applicable federal statute, Section 966 of the Revised
Statutes, provides that interest shall be allowed
from date thereof on all judgments in civil causes
recovered in a district court. Under this statute,
as appellant admits, appellee was entitled to
interest at least from the date of entry of judgment on the mandate. It has been held to be
within the equity of Section 966 of the Revised
Statutes to award interest from the date of the
verdict where, without fault of the plaintiff, an
appreciable time has elapsed between the rendition of the verdict and the entry of the judgment.
Moreover, Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c,

7
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provides that, unless the court otherwise directs,
judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be
entered forthwith by the clerk. Under said rule,
the date of the verdict and the date when the
judgment should have been entered are the same
in this case. For these reasons, we conclude that
plaintiff below was entitled to interest from the
date judgment should have been entered as required by said Rule 58. Such award is within the
equity of the federal interest statute on judgments, and is not inconsistent with the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. (Italics ours)
''The judgment appealed from is reversed,
and the cause remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter judgment for the amount
awarded by the jury with interest thereon from
the date of the verdict. ''
Another Fifth Circuit case is that of Gi rens vs.
Missouri-Kansas-Te.ras R. Co. of Texas, 196 F. 2d 905.
For the convenience of the court, we set forth the decision in its entirety.
'' Bv the mandate of this court issued April
23rd, i952, the judgment of the district court
overruling the plaintiff's motion for judgment in
the amount of $12,000.00 was reversed with instructions to enter such a judgment on the verdict
of the jury. The appellant, plaintiff below, now
InoYt'~ the court to amend its mandate so as to
dirert that the judgment to be entered by the
district court provide for interest at the rate of
six per cpnt (tic;,) per annum from the lth day
of December, l~);)l\ the date the plaintiff below
filed his n1otion for judgment on the verdict of
thP jury. In so moving to amend this court's
mnud:ltt', the appellant is following the proper
pro<·t>dnn' a~ approved hy the Supreme Court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U. S.
304, 306, 68 S. Ct. 1039, 92 L. Ed. 1403. In the
same case the Second Circuit had also indicated
that this was the appropriate procedure. 164 F.
2d 21, 23, 1 A.L.R. 2d 475.
"In that case the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict between the decision of the Second Circuit and a decision of this
circuit in Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt,
142 F. 2d 847, 153 A.L.R. 851. In the Second
Circuit case no motion to amend the mandate had
been made during the term at which it was entered
and both the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court on certiorari pretermitted a decision of
the question of whether on proper application
interest should be allowed from the day on which
the plaintiff was originally entitled to judgment
in the district court.
"It is provided in mandatory terms by 28
U.S.C.A. 1961 that 'Interest shall be allowed on
any money judgment in a civil case recovered in
a district court.' That section further provides
that 'Such interest shall be calculated from the
date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate
allowed by State law.' The law of Texas as set
out in Article 5072, Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, provides that interest on judgments shall
be at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum.
Rule 58, F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C.A., provides that
judgment upon the verdict of the jury shall be
entered forthwith by the clerk unless the court
otherwise directs.

''The verdict of the jury was in response to
forty special issues and was rendered on December 4th, 1950. On December 7th, 1950 both the
plaintiff and the defendant moved for judgment
on the jury's verdict. It was not until February
9
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13th, 1951 that the district court decided these
motions and entered judgment for the defendant.
In Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 164 F. 2d 21,
22, Judge Chase speaking for that circuit said:
'Since no judgment could have been entered until the motion pending after verdict
had been decided by the trial court, no interest
can be allowed between the date of the verdict
and May 28, 1945 when that motion was decided and the judgment for the defendant was
erroneously entered.'
"We think that our decision in Louisiana &
Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, supra, was in all respects
sound. Accordingly it is ordered and adjudged
that the mandate of this court heretofore issued
on the 23rd day of April, 1952 be recalled and that
an amended mandate be issued to provide that the
judgment in the amount of $12,000.00 to be entered
by the district court shall provide also for interest
on that amount from the 13th day of February,
1951. To that extent the motion to amend the
mandate is granted.'·
In Coyle Liufs, Inc. rs. [~nited States, C.C.A. 5th,
198 F. 2d 195, the court again re-affirmed the principal
which \H' de~irl' this court to apply in the case at bar.
Tl1at ens(_' \Yns a suit in admiralty. ~\.t the trial, the court
found the libelant had been damaged in the sum of
$21,661.:~.> hut also found mutual fault on the part of
hoth 1>:trt il·~. and, therefore, gave judgment to the
libelant. in t ht> amount of $10,830.67. In the first appeal
from this judgnw11t reported in 195 F. :2d l~ll. the Fifth
Cir<'nit Court found that the rnited States was solely
at f:llllt. :llld rt>\.t'l'~l'd the judgment of the trial court
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directing that the libelant be awarded the full amount
of its damages with interest and costs. The case came
up to the Circuit Court again on the interest question
and was reported in 198 F. 2d 195. In that case, the court
ruled that interest should be allowed from the date
libelant was originally entitled to judgment. The applicable federal law referred to in the opinion allowed interest at the rate of 4% per annum against the Government upon the money judgment. The court said at page
196:
"The interest on the damages should be calculated at the rate of 4% per annum until satisfied and should run from April 25, 1951, the date
on which the libelant was originally entitled to
judgment in the district court.''
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court re-asserted
the rule in the case of Wright vs. Paramount-Richards
Theatres, Inc., et al., C.C.A. 5th, 198 F. 2d 303. The jury
in that case returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $16,000.00. Subsequently, the motion for the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted, and
the judgment entered for the defendants. The court
reversed the trial court judgment, saying (at page 308):
''The cause is reversed with instructions to
enter judgment on the verdict of the jury in
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $16,000.00
with interest from the date on which said judgment should have been entered, April 23, 1951.
See opinion on motion to amend mandate, May
27, 1952, in Givens vs. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 5th Cir., 196 F. 2d 905."
11
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Finally, in the case of Y arno vs. Hedlund Box and
Lumber Co. (Calif.) 237 P. 1002, the jury gave a verdict
for $22,310 on breach of contract. On appeal the court
ruled that the judgment should be reversed and the
cause remanded with instructions to ascertain the worth
of the recovery at the time of the return of the verdict
in accordance with directions given in the opinion. The
trial court was ordered to enter a judgment for the reduced amount. Thereafter, the trial court found the
worth of the recovery at the time of the return of the
verdict was $19,065.69 and allowed interest thereon in
the amount of $1445.69 from the original date of the
judgment. The defendant appealed from that portion of
the judgment which allowed interest, and the judgment
was affirmed.
CONCLUSION
At the time the verdict was handed down by the
jury and the judgment on the verdict was entered in this
case, the amount of plaintiff's damages became liquidated and 'vere definite of ascertainment, and the plaintiff under the statutes of this state is entitled to interest
upon that liquidated claim during the period in which
he was pn'YC'll1Pd from having the use of the money.
The plaintiff would not receive full justice under the
law upon rP i m·d a 1Pnwll1 of the verdict unless such interest
is allowed. \ VP rc~1wdfully conclude that the order of
the <lir-;trid court should be reversed; that the cause
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions
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to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for interest
or the judgment on the verdict from April 23, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,

WOODROW D. WHITE
Attorney for Pla,intiff
a;nd Appellant.
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